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Abstract
This paper examines which variables are statistically significant in a corporate credit
rating process, and if there has been a tightening in rating practice during and after
the financial crisis hit Europe in 2008. We investigate whether we can argue that the
possible tightening of standards can be seen as a procyclical way of assessing credit
ratings. By procyclical ratings we refer to CRAs’ tendency to excessive downgrade in
recession, leading to higher capital cost for the downgraded companies, thus leading to
even poorer results and an intensified recession.
Utilizing annual fundamental values from firms in the Eurozone and the UK from 2004-
2012 with a Moody’s rating, we find indications for such a tightening of standards, but
the evidence is not strong enough to draw any rigid conclusions. All our different models
over predict post-crisis ratings, with significant difference of means. Further we find a
general downgrading post-crisis of approximately 0.75, where a value of 1 equals one sub-
rank rating, adjusted for the effects from corporate fundamental variables. Breaking it
down into cross-section analysis, we find strong evidence that some industries and regions
may have experienced stricter standards than others.
Our analysis is based on two different methods; (1) building models based on pre-crisis
data using corporate financials and macroeconomic variables to compare an out-of- sam-
ple estimation with the actual post-crisis ratings, and (2) using propensity score matching
also using corporate financials.
Keywords: Corporate Credit Rating, Procyclicality, CRAs, Eurozone, Propensity Score
Matching, Panel Data, Pre-crisis vs. Post-crisis.
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1 Introduction
In February 2013 America’s Department of Justice sued Standard and Poor’s for $5
billion, accusing the credit rating agency (CRA) for having knowingly issued overgenerous
ratings. In light of the financial crisis the credit rating agencies in general were blamed
by the public to be inaccurate in their ratings and to have been too optimistic in their
assessment of credit risk in both corporations and nations. History shows that they failed
to downgrade the large investment banks with high- risk structured financial instruments
in their balance sheets.
There has been a lot of focus on the U.S. market and the European sovereign debt crisis
in recent time. Far less focus has been set on the European corporate bond market. In
fact, we have not found any comprehensive studies on this topic since the outburst of the
financial crisis. This paper wants to fill that gap by analyzing credit ratings on corporate
bonds in the Eurozone in the time just before and just after the financial crisis.
We construct a data set that includes long-term corporate credit ratings from Moody’s
Investor Service, accessed from their own database. All corporations except banks and
insurance companies with a rating at a time between 2004 and 2012 are included in the
data set. Financial variables have been exported from Orbis 1 database, which covers
most financial variables mentioned in the credit rating agencies’ criteria guides and other
empirical studies. The sample is limited to corporations within the Eurozone to magnify
the possible effects of the financial crisis, which indeed hit the Eurozone hard. However,
to increase the number of observations the U.K. has been included.
The goal of this paper is two-fold. On one hand, we want to enlighten the process in
which these ratings are assessed. We look at which financial variables are included in
the rating process and the importance of quantitative variables. On the other hand,
we want to analyze whether there has been a tightening in the rating practice. We
will refer to this possible tightening of standards and the CRAs’ tendency to excessive
downgrade in recession as a procyclical rating anatomy. This because downgrades lead
to higher capital cost for the affected companies, thus leading to even poorer results and
an intensified recession.
1Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis database
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The results are, on average, that our models over estimate ratings for the post-crisis
period. The results are robust with a significant difference of means and suggest that
corporates with the same financial fundamentals would receive a lower credit rating after
the crisis. Further we find that the general downgrade post-crisis is approximately 0.75,
where a value of 1 equals one sub-rank rating, adjusted for the effects from corporate
fundamental variables.
The variables found significant in our empirical model are: interest cover, credit period,
sales, and solvency ratio asset based. These are measures of respectively operational, size
and structure. The significant variables are in line with what Koller et al. (2010), Amato
and Furfine (2004) and Blume et al. (1998) find in their studies regarding credit ratings
in the U.S., yet there are some differences.
Our analysis is general in its nature, by accumulating observations from countries and
industries. Due to sample size, cross-section analysis is a challenge, but by carefully
choosing sections we end up with some interesting results for further research. When
analyzing the changes in ratings from pre-crisis to post-crisis period, between speculative-
and investment rated corporates, we cannot find any clear difference. There is however, a
tendency of a smaller downgrade for corporates within Aaa-rated countries compared to
corporates with domicile in the other countries, suggesting that the CRAs has a higher
threshold for downgrades within more robust economies.
We also find support for the CRAs being reactive, or at least not proactive, in their rating
behavior. This is shown through consistently larger difference in ratings for all significant
matching methods when changing the post-crisis period start from 2008 to 2009. It
seems, in other words, that the rating change is lagging compared to market fluctuations.
It additionally supports our previous results that indicate a general tightening of rating
policy.
This paper takes on several different methods to analyze the possible procyclicality of
credit ratings. Initially we regress all variables included in the data set to find any
statistically significant relationship with credit ratings. Then we build two credit rat-
ing benchmark models and one empirical model to conduct an out-of-sample estimation
comparing with actual ratings. As a final stage in the analysis we use propensity score
matching.
When building the benchmark models, we look at Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s
Investor Service’s corporate criteria methods. We use these general guidelines to create
an unrestricted benchmark model built on an ordinary least squares platform by using the
data from 2004-2007. By restricting this model and taking out those variables showing
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as insignificant, we find that only a few of those variables listed in the criteria methods
remain in the model. Taking it a step further, we create an empirical model based on
findings in relevant studies built on a panel data regression platform with fixed effects for
the same time period. We use the benchmark models and the empirical model to make
an out-of-sample estimation of ratings through 2008-2012.
We also use propensity score matching. By using propensity score matching, we are
comparing corporate rating observations between 2004-2007 and 2008-2012, by pairwise
matching observations from each period with similar corporate fundamental characteris-
tics such as size and profitability. These are variables that fluctuated under the financial
crisis and had an effect on credit ratings by itself. By comparing corporate rating observa-
tions with similar characteristics, we are removing these effects. The resulting difference
between the observations from each period, after the propensity score matching, is there-
fore easier to attribute to changes in the CRAs’ rating practice.
The nature of the analysis is a comparison of the conditions before and after the financial
crisis. Due to annual observations of credit ratings and variables, our chance of splitting
of the two periods is limited. The pre-crisis period is defined as 2004 through 2007, while
the post-crisis is defined as 2008 through 2012. To justify our decision to use 2008 as a
starting point of the financial crisis in Europe, we look at both the aggregated GDP for
the Euro Area as well as FTSEEurofirst 300 Index, which measures the performance of
Europe’s 300 larges companies measured by market capitalization (Figure 1).
The GDP growth changes from positive to negative in mid 2008, thus showing signs
of recession. The equity index shows signs of weakness already in 2007, but the real
collapse strikes in 2008. Based on these observations, we think it is reasonable to start
the post-crisis period in 2008.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background and literature review
summarizing relevant information and findings in related studies. Section 3 develops our
research questions. Section 4 explains how the data set was constructed with descriptive
statistics. Section 5 describes the methodology used in this paper and our approaches to
the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents our results from the empirical analysis, while
Section 7 presents the additional cross sectional analysis. Section 8 provides discussion
and limitations regarding our results, while section 9 concludes.
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Figure 1: GDP growth and equity index for the Euro area
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Note: Figure 1 shows the aggregated GDP growth for the Euro Area (red) as well as the FTSEurofirst
300 index (blue). Data Source: Macrobond, (accessed 8 June 2014).
2 Background and literature review
Credit ratings cover a big field of securities. This study focuses on long-term credit
ratings on corporate bonds. Whenever ratings of a different kind are discussed, it will be
clarified.
Today there are over 70 credit rating agencies worldwide (DefaultRisk, 2014). They differ
in size, where they operate geographically, what kind of instruments they rate and what
kind of method they use in their rating process. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) in the U.S. announces a list of those CRAs that are Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), which then means that SEC and other finan-
cial institutions legally can use their ratings (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
2014). Today this list is compiled by nine CRAs, including the three largest; Standard
and Poor’s (S&P), Mood’s Investor Service (Moody’s) and Fitch Ratings (Fitch). ’The
big three’ were the first on the initial list first made in 1975, and they are still the leading
agencies. S&P and Moody’s have the largest market shares, and when including Fitch,
the three CRAs have a combined market share of about 95%. This has been stable over
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the last decade (The Economist, 2007) (Alessi et al., 2013).
The established dominant positions of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch have led to a credit
rating market where rating changes from one CRA may affect the others’ ratings. One
might look at it as a kind of interaction when one of them changes a rating. Gu¨ttler
and Wahrenburg (2007) find evidence suggesting there is a pattern when looking at S&P
and Moody’s ratings. They see that a change from one agency is likely to cause the
other to follow. This effect seems larger when the change is a downgrade. Becker and
Milbourn (2011) are discussing what happened in the rating market when Fitch took a
big chunk of the market in the early 2000s. They saw that ratings in general went up,
but the correlation between the ratings and marked- implied yields fell, implying lower
overall quality of the ratings. Their conclusion is that there is a negative link between
competition and quality. These findings are relevant to this paper because we then know
that whenever credit ratings change more frequently, as in a recession, this may trigger
more rating changes from other companies that again may lead to further downgrades.
In this paper we are interested in understanding how ratings are designed and assessed.
The different CRAs provide the market with extensive guides with criteria they use
in their rating methods. However, these all differ. We focus on S&P and Moody’s.
For S&P they have a criteria guide for all corporate bonds in general. This makes it
easy for users to understand their methodology, though the level of details lack. They
state in their guide that: ”Note that we do not have any predetermined weights for
these categories. The significance of specific factors varies from situation to situation.”
(Standard & Poor’s, 2008). S&P divides their assessment of a credit rating into two
different measures of risk; (1) Business Risk with sub-categories country risk, industry
factors, competitive position, profitability/peer group comparison, and (2) Financial Risk;
country risk, industry factors, competitive position, profitability/peer group comparison.
They have an extended guide discussing the importance of each of these variables, but,
as mentioned, the weighing of each depends solely on the situation.
In the case for Moody’s, they provide guides for different industries. This makes the
guides more detailed in terms of variables and weighing, but it is not easily accumulated
in a single rating model. By looking at a sample of the different industries (global
chemical 2013, global surface transportation and logistics 2013, regulated electric and
gas utilities, global steel 2012, global retail 2011, global telecommunications 2010, global
automobile 2007, global tobacco 2010) we see that the overall measures can be generalized.
We see that they use mostly measures of size/scale, profitability, leverage, coverage,
financial policies and business profile. Further some more specific industries also measure
diversification, franchise strength, growth potential, operating environment and market
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presence/market share.
One of the objectives of this paper is to determine which variables are explanatory in a
rating process based on quantitative methods. We then look at other studies that deter-
mine a set of significant variables for model making. Blume et al. (1998) and Amato and
Furfine (2004) both build rating models looking at the U.S. corporate bond market using
S&P ratings. Blume et al find book debt to assets, net income to assets, market equity,
market model beta, interest coverage and book assets as significant variables. Amato et
al find long-term debt, total debt, operating margin, market value, market model beta and
interest coverage. Considering natural differences in the data, these two models are quite
a like. Pettit et al. (2004) also looks at the U.S. market and S&P ratings. They do
not use the same method, but they also try to find explanatory variables. They find
several variables with statistical significance; market capitalization, sales, assets, market
leverage, debt/EBITDA, EBITDA coverage and EBIT coverage. A more recent study
from Hung et al. (2013) looking at the U.S. market and S&P ratings shows that variables
in all categories for both Business and Financial Risk, mentioned by S&P and Moody’s,
are significant. As a more conservative view, Koller et al. (2010) state that the only two
variables explaining the credit ratings are a measure of size (market capitalization, total
sales, total assets etc.) and a form of interest cover (Koller et al., 2010). Even though
these studies are based on the U.S. market we assume the results are representative for
Europe as well.
Another aspect we need to consider is whether to use ratings from only one or more
CRAs in our analysis. Moon and Stotsky (1993) find that S&P and Moody’s use different
determinants, and also weigh them differently. They also find that if the rating is self-
selection or not is important in the case for Moody’s ratings. A more recent study by
Kra¨mer and Gu¨ttler (2008) propose that ratings from S&P and Moody’s contain different
information, which suggests they set the ratings differently. While Livingston et al. (2010)
do not look at the determinants, this study also concludes that the ratings are different
to some extent. There is evidence that Moody’s ratings are more conservative than S&P,
and that investors also assign more reliance to these more conservative ratings. Gu¨ttler
and Wahrenburg (2007) further state that Moody’s are timelier than S&P in their rating
changes. These studies conclude that ratings from different CRAs are to some extent
unlike. Optimally we would then use ratings from S&P and Moody’s, as we might get
different results. However, due to accessibility and the width of this paper limit us to
only using ratings from one CRA, Moody’s.
We want to focus on long-term credit ratings. Compared to short-term ratings, they have
a goal of assessing the long-term credit risk. By doing this, the CRAs must focus more
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on structures that are affected over time rather than measures that can fluctuate over
shorter periods. Therefore the CRAs want to obtain stable ratings and not be disturbed
by the anatomy of business cycles. ’Rating through’ the cycle is a term used in empirical
studies on this subject. As an example, this is what S&P has to say about ratings and
business cycles: ”We do not - and cannot - aim to ’rate through the cycle’ entirely. Rating
through the cycle requires an ability to predict the cyclical pattern - usually extremely
difficult to do.” (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). So even though the CRAs state they try to
rate without dealing with the business cycles, they also acknowledge that this is a very
hard thing to do in practice.
Altman and Rijken (2004) tries to explain how the CRAs obtain these stable ratings by
breaking it down into two sources of stability; (1) the ’through-the-rating’ methodology
and (2) the migration policy of the agencies. The study concluded that both sources of
stability are contributing equally to the rating stability. In details, they find that the
credit quality needs to exceed the level of rating class by 1.25 before any changes are
done, and when triggered ratings are only partly adjusted. This tells us a lot about
the migration policy. After the dot com-bubble in 2002, Moody’s announced that they
would try to enhance the timeliness and quality of their ratings: ”More aggressive ratings
changes - such as downgrading a rating by several notches immediately in reaction to
adverse news rather than slowly reducing the rating over a period of time - as well as
shortening the rating review cycle to a period of weeks from the current period of several
months.” (The Financial Times, 2002).
Many studies look at the impact of business cycles on credit ratings. Amato and Furfine
(2004) do not find any evidence that credit ratings in general are unduly influenced by
the business cycle. However, they find evidence of procyclicality in two special cases;
when the sample is limited to only investment grade or only initial ratings. They define
procyclicality by having their null-hypothesis: ”business cycle variables should not have
a marginal effect on the ratings assigned to a firm”. This definition is not directly
comparable to the one of this thesis, but they examine this questions looking at firms’
underlying financial and business characteristics, making the studies like to some degree.
Lo¨ﬄer has done several studies on the subject. First he shows that ratings indeed are
very stable, but at a cost of a lower default prediction power (Lo¨ﬄer, 2004). In a later
study, he finds that there might be a vital information loss when the CRAs are not taking
action when a possible change in credit rating likely is reversed shortly (Lo¨ﬄer, 2005).
He argues that the market’s information preferences are not homogeneous, and therefore
that this conclusion is debatable. To further analyze the problem, he tests if the CRAs
are able to see through the cycle and rate correctly, as they claim. The results are that
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they truly have this ability, and that their long-term rating is correct (Lo¨ﬄer, 2006).
His findings are not related to the time after the financial crisis, thus his conclusions are
not representative for our results. However, he uses a broad set of data from 1980-2005,
making his results a good indication of how the CRAs have performed up until his last
study.
Other studies that look at the impact of a crisis on ratings are done by looking at national
economies and sovereign ratings. This is not the topic in this paper, therefore the results
are not discussed in detail. However, because of similarity in methods, we mention a
study from the East Asian crisis in the 1990s. Ferri et al. (1999) demonstrate that CRAs
failed to predict the crisis, and also became excessively conservative and downgraded
the affected countries more than their economies’ fundamentals would justify afterwards,
making the crisis worse. This is an interesting find, but as mentioned this is a case
with sovereign ratings, not companies. The method they use is similar to one we are
using making a model based on a time series and then making out-of-sample estimations,
comparing with actual ratings.
Manso (2013) relates the stability in ratings to feedback effects. He argues that rather
than focusing solely on the accuracy of the ratings, the CRAs should also look at the
effects of downgrades. Knowing that downgrades from one agency affect ratings from
other, Manso states that the result of this might be increasing default frequency. His
argument is that the CRAs by changing the rating, also changes the cost of capital for
the bond issuer, and therefore this can be seen as a self-fulfilling spiral, where a downgrade
leads to higher cost of capital that again can lead to further downgrade and so on. As
an alternative point of view, Blume et al. (1998) tries to look at stricter rating policy
as a reason for lower ratings over time. Using data from 1973-1992, he concludes, with
caution, that stricter policy explains the decline in ratings at that given time rather than
a decline in the debt quality itself. He further finds that accounting ratios and market
based risk measures might be more informative for larger companies.
Another important aspect to consider in this paper is the effect of new regulations. One
can divide regulations into two different grounds; (1) regulations on the financial market
and the use of credit ratings, and (2) regulations on the CRAs themselves. The latter
part needs evaluation because of new regulations that came right after the financial crisis,
which may be an important factor explaining a possible tightening in rating standards.
The CRAs were first ’self-regulated’. Prior to the crisis all the European CRAs had to
do was to send an annual letter to the supervisory authorities, and also have an annual
meeting discussing the Code of Conduct, at that time given by the Committee of Euro-
pean Securities Regulators. They only had to follow the IOSCO Code (The Technical
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Committee of The International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004), which
is a statement of principles regarding the activities of credit rating agencies. Now mea-
sures have been taken to limit the way credit ratings can be assessed. Utzig (2010)
discusses how the different regulations were set in place in the U.S. and Europe. The
process started after the G-20 summit in November 2008. At that time, many European
countries wanted to regulate the CRAs and ensure better quality ratings. Both the Eu-
ropean Commission and Parliament were quick to act and made future plans in terms of
a stand-alone European regulation, with the goal of later end up with a globally consis-
tent regulation. The initial regulations considered transparency of rating methods, the
number of expertise staff at CRAs, regular monitoring and potential conflicts of interests
(Utzig, 2010). Further the IOSCO Code was set as a minimum standard. The European
Commission provides a time line of regulations, discussions and working papers regard-
ing this (European Commision, 2014). The first regulations regarding CRAs’ technical
standards came out in May 2012: ”The regulatory technical standards will ensure a level
of playing field, transparency and adequate protection of investors across the Union and
contribute to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services” (European Commi-
sion, 2014). Measures to ensure certain standards and transparency are also taken in the
U.S., but those will not be discussed.
There has been massive public critique after different economical crisis, complaining that
the CRAs do not generate qualified ratings. In hindsight of the financial crisis, the focus
has been on corporate credit ratings in the U.S. and sovereign ratings in Europe. Very
little research has been made on the accuracy of credit ratings related to European cor-
porates. Looking back, Partnoy (2002) highlights many examples of failure to predict
defaults from the 1970s and onwards. His claim is that credit ratings are a paradox -
agencies possess so much power, but they do not predict defaults, as they should. He fur-
ther states that the CRAs exist mostly because of numerous legal rules and regulations,
and that regulatory dependence then explains this paradox. When comparing the perfor-
mance of the two leading agencies, Kra¨mer and Gu¨ttler (2008) find evidence that ratings
from one company contain other information than from the other, concluding that none
of the agencies uniformly outperform the other. A common conclusion is that CRAs’ task
of assessing credit risk is complex and difficult when you cannot predict cyclical patterns.
3 Research question development
In this paper, we aim to analyze long-term credit ratings for European corporates in the
time just before, during and just after the recent financial crisis starting in 2008. We
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investigate which explanatory factors are included in the rating process, and check the
dynamics of these ratings through the financial crisis and see if ratings standards have
changed.
The CRAs were subject to intense critique during and after the financial crisis. The crit-
icism involved the CRAs’ rating practice in which one claimed that rating agencies were
too relaxed in the rating process and initially gave too high ratings, especially on financial
instruments such as CDOs and sovereign ratings. The risk of these financial instruments
was allegedly underestimated by the rating agencies either because of a lack of compe-
tition, poor accountability, or most likely the complexity of the instruments resulting in
difficulty in assessing the risk (Taylor, 2009). One observation is that corporate credit
ratings are rarely mentioned in this context, and when they are, it is usually in situations
where structured financial instruments have major impact on the companies involved.
The most common example is the major global investment banks that got into problems
due to large amounts of investment-rated, structured financial instruments in their bal-
ance sheets with potential high risk. The investment banks had solid credit ratings, along
with their structured products, but history show that those were not accurate.
CDOs and similar structured finance instruments are beyond the scope of this paper and
we focus on corporate credit ratings. We focus on European companies. The focus in
Europe the recent years has to a greater extent been on the sovereign ratings and the
leverage in European countries. This limited research on the corporate ratings leaves us
an impeccable opportunity to explore something that until know is fairly unknown.
The credit rating process is complex and includes quantitative as well as qualitative
factors. The process can be seen as the CRAs’ own business secrets, although regulations
demand that there is transparency in the rating decisions. Our focus is on the quantitative
variables due to data accessibility and objectivity, since there is much more consistent
way to obtain fundamental corporate ratios rather than more subjective, qualitative
variables. By quantitative variables we mean corporate fundamental values and macro
economic indicators.
More specifically we want to investigate the factors that affect a credit rating in order to
gain understanding of how and why credit rating changes. This is also important for later
analysis, to be able to construct prediction models to examine rating dynamics. Thus,
our first research question is:
Which quantitative variables are statistically significant in a corporate credit rating pro-
cess?
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The previous question lead to this paper’s main focus, which is whether the CRAs in
general tightened their standards in credit ratings after the crisis. We can see if lower
credit ratings are justified by lower corporate fundamentals, or if there is a mis-match. If
they actually downgraded corporates excessively, we may have a tendency of procyclical
behavior, which we define as significant underrating after the crisis.
A general overrating during economic expansions can be argued to enhance economic
booms with higher levels of risk taking, potentially accelerate into recession. Especially
when taking into account the CRAs strong position within the bond market and the
power of influence they possess.
A general overestimation of credit ratings in expansion periods will, all else equal, lead
to a decrease in company’s cost of capital, which will result in more accessible funding
and hence opportunity for greater investment and growth for the companies.
The same rationale applies for underratings in recessions. If the CRAs systematically un-
derrate corporates more than what fundamentals justify, we could argue that corporate
funding costs rise excessively during the financial crisis, leading to less accessible funding
and thus a larger reduction in investment activity. Our second and main question is
therefore:
Has there been a tightening in corporate rating practice during and after the financial
crisis?
4 Data description
In this section, the collection processes and data set used are described. The data set
used in this study is the result of combining two main sources; long term credit ratings
from Moody’s and financial ratios from the Orbis database.
4.1 Ratings
Our data set consists of historical annual long-term ratings from 2004 through 2012. In
order to find a complete list of corporate ratings in our defined period, we contacted both
Moody’s and S&P directly. S&P’s policy is not to give out their ratings for academic
purposes. We managed, however, to obtain an academic subscription from Moody’s.
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One obstacle was to find complete historical time series. Moody’s responded that they
did not have historical time series data and that their only solution was to put an analyst
to create the data set, which we later could buy.
Our response was to manually collect each observation, by going into each company
profile, retrieving historical ratings for each year for the total sample of 1226 corporates.
We established a set of rules we applied when collecting all the rating-observations. These
were:
• Not register the specific date the rating is assigned/upgraded/downgraded. Only
on an annual basis.
• If there exist two ratings for the same year, due to change in ratings, the most
recent rating will apply, i.e. the current rating 31/Dec each year.
Because all ratings are manually retrieved, some errors may occur. We have however
tried to reduce this risk to a minimum by going through all ratings, verifying that the
ratings are consistent with the database.
The ratings exported are the long-term ratings, which are defined by Moody’s as:
”Ratings assigned to issuers or obligations with an original maturity of one year or more
and reflect both the likelihood of a default on contractually payments and the expected
financial loss suffered in the event of default” (Moody’s Investor Service, 2013).
We have limited the observations to all corporate companies in the Eurozone. Due to
a limited sample size, we also included the UK due to UK’s tight relationship with the
European market and the number of companies registered in the UK. Knowing that the
UK had a negative GDP growth during the crisis and their sovereign rating was recently
downgraded in 2013, makes us confident that this country can be compared to the rest
of the Eurozone (Moody’s Investors Service, 2013).
All financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies are excluded from this
data set, because of their complex capital-structure that makes financial structural ratios
more difficult to use. Furthermore there has been implementation of the Basel Accord II
and preparations to implement Basel III in the time period we look at, making a time
comparison harder to analyze alongside with all other industries (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2013).
In order to decrease the possibility of survivorship bias, we have also included all with-
drawn ratings from the same period.
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4.2 Financial ratios
All financial ratios are exported from the Orbis database. The database contains in-
formation on both listed and unlisted companies and includes, among others, company
financials, financial strength indicators, stock data and industry research.
One challenge with the actual export was to identify the same company in the Orbis
database as registered at Moody’s, since Moody’s only register the rated companies with
their own company identification number. This was resolved by running an open Internet
search to check the company’s history, possible acquisitions, name changes etc.
The ratios selected are based on the credit ratings criteria from both S&P and Moody’s.
S&P separate the risk factors in two main categories; Business Risk and Financial Risk.
The relationship between the two risk types is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Business risk / Financial risk
Financial Risk Profile
Business Risk Profile Minimal Modest Intermediate Aggressive Highly Leveraged
Excellent AAA AA A BBB BB
Strong AA A A- BBB- BB-
Satisfactory A BBB+ BBB BB+ B+
Weak BBB BBB- BB+ BB- B
Vulnerable BB B+ B+ B B-
Note: Table 1 shows the relationship of business risk and financial risk in relation to credit
rating. S&P do not use the lowest ratings in the matrix. This is because those ratings al-
ways reflect some impending crisis or extraordinary vulnerability. Data source: (Standard &
Poor’s, 2008)
As we base this paper on quantitative data, we do not have a particular focus on Business
Risk, which implies more qualitative characteristics such as industry factors and compet-
itive position. The only exception is business profitability. The Financial Risk however
is easier to quantify, thus constituting a larger focus in our analysis. S&P divides Fi-
nancial Risk into several sub-categories; Liquidity/Short-term factors, Capital structure,
Cash Flow adequacy, Accounting and Financial policies/Risk tolerance and Governance.
Pursuant to S&P, the single most critical aspect of credit rating decisions is cash flow
analysis. This is because interests and principals are not serviced from earnings, but from
cash. This is even more important for speculative-graded companies due to the lack of
flexibility to access external financing.
Another important part of S&P’s financial review is the company’s capital structure. An
analysis of the capital structure is used to establish the company’s financial flexibility
and how leveraged it is. (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). Liquidity and short-term factors are
also listed as a category due to the influence on the financial flexibility of the firm.
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In contrast to S&P’s general criteria for all industries, Moody’s only operates with specific
ratings criteria for each industry. In general, in line with S&P, they divide the risk
measures into several ’rating factors’ . These factors vary with industry, but we can
observe certain similarities in the segmentation of risk that recur in all industry criteria.
Scale recur in all industries, often as total sales, and with somewhat different annotations.
This also applies to leverage and coverage that appear under names such as ’Financial
Strength’, ’Cash Flow and Debt Service’, and ’Financial Strength, Key Financial Metrics’.
Profitability is also pervasive in all industries. Like S&P, Moody’s also operates with
Business Profile and Financial Policy, which are largely qualitative in their characteristics.
To summarize, we see from both S&P’s- and Moody’s rating criteria that they to a certain
degree segmenting the quantified risk relatively equal, focusing on both return on capital-
and profitability measures, as well as more structural measures (such as leverage), and
short term measures (such as liquidity and coverage). Based on these rating criteria we
have selected general ratios that are easy to compare over time, industries and coun-
tries, segmented into the following categories: Profitability and Efficiency, Operational,
Structure and Size.
Note that both CRAs also emphasize cash flow adequacy as an important factor. We
have included some variables that include cash flow (CF/Operating revenue, EBITDA
margin, all within the Efficiency category), but optimally we should have more related
to this factor. The reason for the lack of such ratios is the data-coverage in Orbis, where
they do not have any other ratios covering cash flow. We could have exported such ratios
from other sources, but decided not to, due to uncertainty factors related to incorporating
more than one accounting database (with individual sets of accounting standards etc.)
in to the data set.
Another important aspect is that both S&P and Moody’s have a much more thorough
approach in these rating processes, than looking at general ratios. Because of the require-
ment for objectivity and general ratios, in order to achieve consistency in our analysis,
our paper faces natural limitations on this point. Our analysis is only scratching the
surface of a comprehensive rating process, but nevertheless illustrates many of the main
factors.
In addition to corporate fundamentals, we have included some of the most used macroeco-
nomic indicators from each country together with sovereign ratings. All macroeconomic
data is exported from The World Bank (2014). Macroeconomic variables have been used
in previous studies as time trend variables or to measure the business cycle. These mea-
sures are first of all used to assess sovereign ratings, but we want to include them to see
the statistical fit for corporate ratings. Country risk and environment are two factors
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mentioned by S&P and Moody’s. They further state that this is not directly comparable
to the variable sovereign rating, but maybe some of these macroeconomic indicators can
help explaining this type of risk.
See table 2 for statistical description of the selected variables. The total list of ratios and
macroeconomic indicators, together with definitions, are summarized in Appendix A.
4.3 Data refinements
The ratings exported are from Moody’s, based on Moody’s own ’Long term Rating Scale’.
In order to perform analysis, all ratings have been assigned to a numerical rating ranging
from 1-21, starting with Aaa assigned as 1. Note that we are assigning numerical ratings
to all sub ranks as well, such as Aa1 = 2, and Aa2 =3 in order to achieve a more detailed
analysis. This way of assigning numerical values has been used in all empirical studies
discussed in the literature review. See table 3 for a complete ranking chart.
An important observation is that relatively few companies are listed. Out of 1226 initial
companies, 883 are unlisted. This causes relative few observations for all ratios involving
market cap. This restricts the observations to a larger extent than we find satisfactory
for our analysis. Thus, we ignore market cap and all related ratios in our analysis. As
substitutes, we measure firm size in two ways; by total sales and by total assets. We
have altered the scale for both sales and assets by including both variables as natural
logarithms. By doing this, we achieve a more even distribution across companies that are
easier to include in the analysis.
The interest cover ratio range from -95.6 to 839.9 in our data set. A negative interest cover
implies that the company does not have enough operating revenue to pay its interests.
Such a situation is not sustainable in the long-term, and therefore implies that something
has to change. Blume et al. (1998) suggests replacing negative interest coverage ratios
with the value of zero. On the other side of the scale, at high interest coverage ratios,
it is natural to assume that the difference in the ability to fulfill debt obligations is
marginal. Blume et al. (1998) thus set any interest rate coverage greater than 10.0 to
the value of 10.0 based on an arbitrary choice. However, in our subsequent regression
analysis we found that there were positive changes in results from setting a maximum
interest coverage ratio equal to 15 compared to 10, related to coefficients and explanatory
power of the regressions. The interest coverage ratio used in this data set is therefore
set with a maximum ratio of 15. We also see the use of limits on interest coverage in
Amato and Furfine (2004) where the same arguments apply. They divide the variable
into four different scales; [0,5], [5,10], [10,20] and [20,100], where the lower and upper
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Table 2: Variables before and after crisis
Prior to the During/after the
financial crisis financial crisis
(2004-2007) (2008-2012) Difference
Variable Mean st.dev Mean st.dev of mean
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
ROE using P/L b. tax, % 22.05 78.41 14.24 67.69 7.81**
ROCE using P/L b. tax, % 18.55 57.01 11.43 47.79 7.13**
ROA using P/L b. tax, % 3.9 12.45 2.58 10.7 1.32**
ROE using net income, % 16.55 70.77 8.67 58.33 7.88**
ROCE using net income, % 15.32 57.14 9.68 45.03 5.64**
ROA using net income, % 2.92 11.87 1.64 10.66 1.28**
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
Profit Margin, % 9.66 18.8 7.79 21.11 1.87**
Gross Margin, % 43.07 22.25 41.61 25.56 1.47
EBITDA margin, % 17.89 19.34 17.82 21.32 0.06
EBIT margin, % 11.66 21.11 12.18 27.5 -0.52
CF / Operating revenue, % 13.67 16.75 12.5 17.64 1.17*
O
p
er
at
io
n
al Net assets turnover, x 2.84 22.06 1.96 11.24 0.88*
Interest cover, x 7.52 42.9 4.29 20.61 3.24**
Stock turnover, x 41.12 95 47.43 104.88 -6.32*
Collection period, days 68.77 90.22 58.53 87.87 10.24**
Credit period, days 46.17 52.31 44.29 60.38 1.88
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
Current ratio, x 4.53 12.49 3.93 10.65 0.60*
Liquidity ratio, x 4.3 12.39 3.77 10.68 0.53*
Shareholders liquidity r, x 8.02 54.87 9.34 64.97 -1.32
Solvency (Asset based), % 29.72 30.5 30.37 33.53 -0.65
Solvency (Liability based), % 32.14 27.42 31.68 27.69 0.46
Gearing, % 181.22 183.63 178.55 190.37 2.66
S
iz
e Sales, mil EUR 1470.17 928.33 1475.3 928.6 -5.13
Total Assets, mil EUR 3286.95 1947.11 3401.39 1953.12 -114.44**
M
ac
ro
Unemployment, % 6.12 2.38 7.52 4.29 -1.40**
Inflation, % 2.02 0.7 2.29 1.3 -0.27**
GDP growth, % 3.22 1.23 -0.29 2.54 3.51**
Current Balance, % 1.88 6.2 1.91 5.28 -0.02
Sovereign Rating 1.17 0.71 1.64 2.21 -0.47**
Note: Table 2 Provides descriptive statistics for company rating before the financial crisis (2004-2007)
versus after and during the financial crisis (2008-2012). The difference in means are analyzed by a
two-sided t-test. Symbols * and ** denote significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively. Data source:
Bureau Van Dijk Orbis Database (accessed 30 March 2014) and World Bank World Development
Indicators (accessed 7 April 2014).
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Table 3: Convertion table for numerical ratings
Global Long Term Rating Scale
Aaa Aaa 1
In
ve
st
m
en
t
G
ra
d
e
Aa
Aa1 2
Aa2 3
Aa3 4
A
A1 5
A2 6
A3 7
Baa
Baa1 8
Baa2 9
Baa3 10
Ba
Ba1 11
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
G
ra
d
e
Ba2 12
Ba3 13
B
B1 14
B2 15
B3 16
Caa
Caa1 17
Caa2 18
Caa3 19
Ca Ca 20
C C 21
Note: Moody’s add numerical modifiers
1,2 and 3 to each generic rating class
from Aa including Caa. The modifier
1 indicates that the obligation ranks in
the higher end of its generic rating class;
2 indicates a mid-range ranking, while 3
indicates a ranking in the lower end of
that generic rating class. (Moody’s In-
vestor Service, 2013)
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values are assigned to 0 and 100. However, this method is more complicated and we
continue working with the method used by Blume et al. (1998).
As we conducted our analysis, we tried to refine the data set by winsorizing the variables
to eliminate the chance of spurious outliers creating complications. We find, however, that
we do not generate any other results by this form of censoring. Therefore we proceeded
without refining the possible outliers in any way.
4.4 Final dataset
The final data set consists of 1226 companies, constituting 4270 firm-year observations
from 28 different industries. See Figure 3 for a detailed overview. Our sample includes all
firms in the Eurozone including UK and spanning the entire ratings spectrum, including
both investment and speculative grade firms. The vast majority of the companies in
our sample are however in the rating categories of A to B, as seen in the annual rating
distribution in Figure 4. This may suggest that the range from A to B is an effective
rating level for most companies. In terms of leverage, Koller et al. (2010) states that few
companies have very high ratings, since a very low leverage would cost much in terms of
tax savings and management discipline. The same argument can be used for the lower
part of the rating scale, where high leverage will lead to very high interest ratios and thus
a more costly and less accessible funding.
All financial ratios used and their annual mean values are listed in Table 2. During and
after the financial crisis (Table 2), the general tendency was a worsening in corporate
fundamentals, with profitability ratios and macroeconomic variables as the most signifi-
cant. When analyzing the ratings later in this paper, we therefore have to consider this
observation, especially in the question about whether the CRAs downgraded excessively
during and after the crisis.
As mentioned earlier, the ratios are grouped in the following categories; Profitability,
Efficiency, Operational, Structure, Size and Macro.
5 Methodology
Different methods of analysis are used in this thesis. We perform numerous regression
analyses to identify the most important quantitative ratios in the credit rating process.
Matching propensity score is utilized in order to compare long-term credit ratings be-
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Figure 2: Number of long term rating observations for each country
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Note: Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of number of rating observations within each country.
Data Source: Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
Figure 3: Number of long term rating observations within each industry
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Note: Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of number of rating observations within each industry.
Data Source: Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
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Figure 4: Number of companies within each rating class each year
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Note: Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of number of rating observations within each rating class
for each year. Data Source: Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
fore and after the crisis, and in that way investigate whether the credit rating agencies
tightened their credit rating policy in the years following the financial crisis.
In this part, we are giving an account for the methods used and the most central assump-
tions and conditions associated with each method.
5.1 Regression models
As mentioned in the introduction, we use regression models to determine which variables
are explanatory for the credit ratings using the data from 2004 to 2007. We build two
types of models; benchmark models and an empirical model.
Benchmark models
We will build two benchmark models using ordinary least square (OLS) regression derived
from the CRAs’ own criteria.
The first model will be an unrestricted model, which includes variables from all categories
mentioned by the CRAs in their criteria guides. The models will be built by using
variables from all categories from our variable list, which all are relevant looking at the
criteria guides. We can further break down these categories by using the clusters of
correlating variables shown in the correlation matrix in Appendix B. This model will
from this point be referred to as OLS unrestricted.
The second model will be a restricted model, which is a statistical restriction of the first
model. This model will only include those variables from the unrestricted model, which
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show up as significant from our sample data set, at a 5% significance level. This model
will be referred to as OLS restricted.
Empirical model
The empirical model is build by taking into account all those variables shown as significant
in previous studies. Further this model will be a panel data regression, which uses other
properties of the data set. This model will be derived in the same manner as the OLS,
only with the empirically shown statistical variables mentioned in the literature review.
This model will be referred to as Panel data regression FE.
We will then use these models to make an out-of-sample estimation, comparing the esti-
mations to the actual ratings from 2008 - 2012 to see if the models over- or under predicts
the ratings.
Panel data regression
Panel data models examine fixed and/or random effects of the entity (Park, 2005). The
core difference between fixed and random effects models lies in the role of the dummy
variables. If dummies are considered a part of the intercept, this is a fixed effects model.
In a random effects model, the dummies act as an error term. Statistically, fixed effects
always give consistent results, but they might not be the most efficient model to run
(Princeton Data and Statistical Services, 2014). Random effects will give higher p-values,
as they are more efficient estimators.
The generally accepted way of determining whether you are dealing with random of fixed
effects, is to run a Hausman-test (Hauser, 2013). This tests the more efficient random
effects model to a less efficient but consistent fixed effects model to check if the more
efficient model also gives consistent results. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients
estimated by both models are the same. An insignificant p-value suggests that it is safe
to use random effects.
From the Hausman-test in our case, we get a low and significant p-value, suggesting we
should continue using fixed effects.
5.2 Prediction
For the prediction we will use the three different models and estimate ratings out-of-
sample for 2008-2012. The predicted numerical ratings are converted to the alphabetical
rating scale according to Moody’s rating chart (Table 3 - Ranking chart for Moody’s
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ratings). The limit of each rating category is set to the numerical values in the table (i.e.
the category Aa includes all estimated ratings equal or greater than 2 and less than 5).
These estimations will then be compared to actual ratings. We will not be able to look
at the comparison of each company because of the vast number of observations, but we
will accumulate both the estimated and the actual ratings and illustrate the results in a
table for each model.
The goal by doing this out-of-sample prediction is not to check the performance of the
different models. The comparison will function as an indication on whether the CRAs
have a stricter (less strict) rating policy after the crisis if the models over predict (under
predict).
5.3 Propensity score matching
When analyzing whether the credit rating agencies actually tightened their credit rating
policies, we investigate whether the credit ratings have changed significantly from pre-
crisis (2004-2007) to post-crisis (2008-2012). In this case, our results may be attributed
to changes in corporate fundamental values, rather than rating policy decisions.
We use propensity score matching (hereby PSM) to adjust for such fundamental fluctu-
ations, and check whether a general corporate downgrading after the financial crisis can
be attributed to tightening of corporate credit rating policies by the CRAs. Propensity
Score matching were first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as a method to
match two groups based on different characteristics. This type of matching method tries
to regenerate the characteristics to a ’treated’ group by constructing a control group that
fits the characteristics of the treatment group as much as possible. In this way we can
find an estimate for the counter factual difference, and thus calculate the mean difference
between the control- and treated group. In our analysis; we measure the mean difference
of long term ratings before (control group = ’untreated’) and after the financial crisis
(treatment group), matching on corporate fundamental characteristics. Compared to
matching directly on covariates, PSM reduce the dimensionality of matching to a single
dimension, the propensity score (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
5.3.1 Propensity score estimation
The propensity score estimation in this analysis includes a binary treatment variable,
before and after crisis previously defined as respectively ’untreated’ (treatment=0) and
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’treated’ (treatment=1). Propensity scores are estimated using a Logit regression model
with treatment as the dependent variable.
The explanatory variables are selected based on company characteristics rather than
focusing on estimating the true propensity score as accurately as possible. The most
important aspect is that the variables contribute to estimates of the propensity score
that can match covariates between treated and control subgroups. This is more important
than that the model estimates the true propensity score as accurately as possible (Grilli
and Rampichini, 2011).
5.3.2 Propensity score matching
There are several matching methods, in this thesis we are testing four of them: Nearest-
Neighbor (NN) matching, Kernel matching, Radius matching and Mahalanobis-metric
matching.
6 Empirical analysis and results
6.1 Correlation
As an introduction to the results, we simply illustrate the coefficients from the correlation
between the ratings and the given set of variables. By splitting the data we can see which
financial variables that are statistically correlating with the rating process in the two
different periods.
What we see is an increasing number of significant correlations from pre-crisis to post-
crisis period. (Table 4).
The results are that, on average, financial variables and therefore quantitative methods
have become a more reliable tool when giving a company a credit rating.
6.2 Regression models
As mentioned in the introduction and method, we use regression models to determine
which variables are explanatory for the credit ratings in order to answer our first re-
search question in this thesis - Which quantitative variables are statistically significant
in a corporate credit rating process? First we build two multiple ordinary least squares
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Table 4: Variable correlation with long-term rating
Correlation
Variable 2004-2007 2008-2012
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
ROE using P/L b. tax, % -0.05 -0.13*
ROCE using P/L b. tax, % -0.08* -0.12*
ROA using P/L b. tax, % -0.16* -0.28*
ROE using net income, % -0.04 -0.16*
ROCE using net income, % -0.05 -0.12*
ROA using net income, % -0.13* -0.24*
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
Profit Margin, % -0.19* -0.29*
Gross Margin, % -0.04 -0.09*
EBITDA margin, % -0.07 -0.02
EBIT margin, % -0.07* -0.05
CF / Operating revenue, % -0.15* -0.16*
O
p
er
at
io
n
al Net assets turnover, x -0.08* -0.01
Interest cover, x -0.26* -0.30*
Stock turnover, x -0.00 0.01
Collection period, days -0.03 0.04
Credit period, days 0.02 0.07*
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
Current ratio, x 0.02 0.02
Liquidity ratio, x 0.02 0.01
Shareholders liquidity r, x -0.06* 0.02
Solvency r (Asset based), % -0.08* -0.11*
Solvency r (Liability based), % -0.00 0.00
Gearing, % 0.10* 0.16*
S
iz
e logSales, mil EUR -0.26* -0.35*
logTotal Assets, mil EUR -0.28* -0.33*
M
ac
ro
Current Balance, % 0.11* 0.07*
GDP growth, % 0.09* 0.01
Inflation, % 0.00 -0.00
Unemployment, % -0.06* 0.01
Sovereign Rating -0.02 0.11*
Note: Table 4 displays coefficients for pairwise correlation between vari-
able and rating for company ratings before the financial crisis (2004-2007)
versus after and during the financial crisis (2008-2012). Symbol * denote
significance level of 5%. Data source: Bureau Van Dijk Orbis Database
(accessed 30 March 2014) and World Bank World Development Indica-
tors (accessed 7 April 2014).
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benchmark models based on S&P’s and Moody’s own criteria. Then we build a panel
data regression model that utilizes more of the information of the data set. Both types
of models are built on data from 2004-2007.
The models are used to make an out-of-sample prediction for the ratings, comparing the
estimated ratings to the actual ratings from 2008-2012. The results of the comparison
will indicate whether the ratings are set justified to the financials of the companies after
the crisis, and therefore help us answer our second research question - Has there been a
tightening in corporate rating practice during and after the financial crisis?
6.2.1 Significant ratios
OLS-unrestricted
The results from the OLS unrestricted are presented in Table 5. We see that four of the
variables show as insignificant.
OLS-restricted
For the OLS restricted, the model is refined into a statistical accepted model, see table
Table 6. The list of variables has been shortened down to five significant determinants,
which is far less than what the CRAs list as their criteria.
Panel data, fixed effects
The results from the panel data regression FE can be seen in Table 7. We see that this
model to some extent look like the OLS restricted.
The overall results from the models tell us that there are few variables that show as
significant. Even if the interpretations of the coefficients within a model does not au-
tomatically say which variables that are most explanatory, the vast difference between
sales and interest cover compared to the rest of the variables gives an indication that
these two variables are heavily weighted in the rating process. This result gives the same
conclusion as the variable correlation as they are the top two variables in the statistical
correlation between variables and ratings in Table 4. These two variables are also the
same as Koller et al. (2010) argue are the most important variables. All the significant
variables from the models will all be discussed under discussions and limitations. Further
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Table 5: OLS regression unrestricted. 2004-2007
LTRating Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
ROCEusingPLbeforetax -0.030 0.005 -6.56 0.000 -0.039 -0.021
ProfitMargin -0.020 0.011 -1.80 0.072 -0.042 0.002
Interestcover15 -0.188 0.041 -4.58 0.000 -0.268 -0.107
CreditPeriod -0.009 0.003 -3.11 0.002 -0.015 -0.003
Collectionperiod 0.001 0.002 0.44 0.660 -0.003 0.005
Liquidityratio -0.036 0.039 -0.92 0.356 -0.113 0.041
SolvencyratioAsset -0.019 0.008 -2.41 0.016 -0.035 -0.003
logSales -1.820 0.170 -10.71 0.000 -2.154 -1.486
SovereignRating 0.115 0.188 0.61 0.540 -0.254 0.485
cons 17.812 0.761 23.39 0.000 16.316 19.307
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.35
Adj R-squared 0.34
Number of obs 560
Note: Table 5 provides descriptive statistics from OLS regression based on pre-crisis observations
(2004-2007).
ROCE using PL before tax:(Profit before tax + Interest paid) / (Shareholders funds + Non current
liabilities)*100
Profit margin: (Profit before tax / Operating revenue)*100
Interest cover: Operating profit / Interest paid
Credit period: (Creditors / Operating revenue)*360
Collection period: (Debtors / Operating revenue)*360
Liquidity ratio: (Current assets Stocks) / Current liabilities
Solvency Asset: (Shareholders funds / Total assets)*100
logSales: Mil EUR
Data source: Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database, World Bank - World Development Indicators and
Moody’s Investor Service.
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Table 6: OLS regression restricted. 2004-2007
LTRating Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
ROCEusingPLbeforetax -0.030 0.005 -6.51 0.00 -0.039 -0.021
ProfitMargin -0.021 0.011 -1.97 0.05 -0.042 -0.000
Interestcover15 -0.180 0.040 -4.43 0.00 -0.259 -0.100
SolvencyratioAsset -0.016 0.008 -2.03 0.04 -0.031 -0.000
logSales -1.796 0.162 -11.06 0.00 -2.114 -1.477
cons 17.313 0.632 27.39 0.00 16.072 18.555
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.34
Adj R-squared 0.33
Number of obs 563
Note: Table 6 provides descriptive statistics from OLS regression restricted based on pre-crisis obser-
vations (2004-2007).
ROCE using PL before tax:(Profit before tax + Interest paid) / (Shareholders funds + Non current
liabilities)*100
Profit margin: (Profit before tax / Operating revenue)*100
Interest cover: Operating profit / Interest paid
Solvency Asset: (Shareholders funds / Total assets)*100
logSales: Mil EUR
Data source: Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database, World Bank - World Development Indicators and
Moody’s Investor Service.
Table 7: Panel data regression, fixed effects. 2004-2007
LTRating Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Interestcover15 -0.059 0.017 -3.54 0.00 -0.091 -0.026
logSales -0.704 0.357 -1.97 0.05 -1.406 -0.003
Creditperiod -0.005 0.002 -2.95 0.00 -0.008 -0.002
SolvencyratioAsset -0.016 0.005 -3.44 0.00 -0.025 -0.007
cons 12.233 1.249 9.79 0.00 9.777 14.689
Prob > F 0
R-squared within: 0.1183
between: 0.1661
overall: 0.1308
Number of obs 584
Number of groups 193
Note: Table 7 provides descriptive statistics from panel data regression with fixed effects based on pre-
crisis observations (2004-2007).
Interest cover: Operating profit / Interest paid
logSales: Mil EUR
Credit period: (Creditors / Operating revenue)*360
Solvency Asset: (Shareholders funds / Total assets)*100
Data source: Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database, World Bank - World Development Indicators and
Moody’s Investor Service.
30
the R2 is moderate in the benchmark models, but low in the empirical model, suggesting
this quantitative method alone is not a good measure for ratings.
6.2.2 Out-of-sample test
The estimations for the three different models are presented in Table 8 as Panel A, B
and C. The left column states the actual rating, while the matrix shows how the model
performed. The diagonal path going from upper left to lower right represents a match of
actual and estimated rating, while over (under) estimations are shown to the left (right)
for the diagonal.
The results are to some degree unambiguous. There is a pattern for over-predicting
ratings in all three models, which is supported by the paired mean-comparison tests
ranging from 0.6 to 0.8 for the three models. We notice that for the higher ratings,
the models under-predicts, but in total the models tend to over-predict. By looking at
the prediction success rate for each rating category we observe that all models tends to
predict better within mid-range rating categories. This coincide with the data description
where the vast majority of the observations in our sample are in the rating categories of
A to B, as seen in the annual rating distribution in Figure 4.
This result of over predictions is a small indication that the CRAs actually rated corpo-
rates stricter after the crisis. Based on these quantitative models alone we can say that
companies need better financials, all others a like, to receive the same rating after the
crisis compared to before.
6.3 Propensity scores
Propensity scores were estimated by a probit regression including the crisis dummy as
a dependent variable (0 = company ratings before crisis, 2004-2007 and 1 = company
ratings during crisis, 2008-2012).
The ratios we ended up with in our final propensity score probit model are: ROCE using
net income, interest cover, solvency ratio asset based, logsales and gross margin. As we
see, the nature of the ratios coincide to a large degree with the ratios used in the OLS
restricted and are reflecting company characteristics within both profitability, efficiency,
structure and operation. We have chosen ratios that we know affect credit rating based
on rating methodology, and the estimated regressions, hence reduced the emphasis on
finding a model that estimate the true propensity score as accurately as possible.
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Table 8: Actual ratings vs predicted ratings
Actual Predicted Rating % Correct
rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca,C Total prediction
Panel A: OLS unrestricted
Aaa 0 4 1 9 6 0 0 0 20 0.0 %
Aa 0 4 15 10 1 0 0 0 30 13.3 %
A 0 11 134 88 7 0 2 0 242 55.4 %
Baa 0 8 106 160 3 0 0 0 277 57.8 %
Ba 0 0 16 152 20 4 0 0 192 10.4 %
B 0 0 1 56 48 13 1 0 119 10.9 %
Caa 0 0 0 7 11 5 1 1 25 4.0 %
Ca and C 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.0 %
Total 0 27 273 482 96 23 4 1 906
Over-estimation frequency 568
Under estimation frequency 338
Difference of mean 0.62**
Panel B: OLS restricted
Aaa 1 3 1 10 5 0 0 0 20 5.0 %
Aa 0 4 14 12 0 0 0 0 30 13.3 %
A 0 14 130 89 7 2 0 0 242 53.7 %
Baa 0 3 113 157 4 0 0 0 277 56.7 %
Ba 0 0 21 157 10 4 0 0 192 5.2 %
B 0 0 1 63 48 5 3 0 120 4.2 %
Caa 0 0 0 8 12 5 1 1 27 3.7 %
Ca and C 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.0 %
Total 1 24 280 496 86 17 4 1 909
Over-estimation frequency 579
Under-estimation frequency 330
Difference of mean 0.70**
Panel C: Panel data FE regression
Aaa 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 21 0
Aa 0 0 11 20 3 0 0 0 34 0.0 %
A 0 0 90 157 12 0 0 0 259 34.7 %
Baa 0 0 50 230 1 0 0 0 281 81.9 %
Ba 0 0 7 184 5 0 0 0 196 2.6 %
B 0 0 0 123 5 0 0 0 128 0.0 %
Caa 0 0 0 24 7 0 0 0 31 0.0 %
Ca and C 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0.0 %
Total 0 0 158 759 37 0 0 0 954
Over-estimation frequency 558
Under-estimation frequency 396
Difference of mean 0.83**
Note: Table 8 provides descriptive statistics of the regression models prediction power. The output
in each panel shows a comparison of the predicted ratings for the post-crisis period (2008-2012)
with the actual credit ratings in the same period. Panel A reflects the estimated coefficients in ta-
ble 5. Panel B corresponds to the estimated coefficients in table 6. Panel C reflects the estimated
coefficients in table 7. The difference in means are analyzed by a two-sided t-test (Observation-
Prediction). Symbols * and ** denote significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively.
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Figure 5: Propensity score distribution
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Note: Figure 5 illustrates the propensity score distribution for untreated (period 2004-2007) and treated
(period 2008-2012). The upper graph are showing the density plot, while the lower graph shows the
histogram. The common support is analyzed by using program ’psmatch2’ in Stata 13. Data Source:
Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database (accessed 30 March 2014) and Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16
March 2014).
6.4 Common support
To ensure that the matched observations from both the control group and treatment group
fell into the PS region of common support, we graphed the propensity score distribution
for both groups. (see Figure 5). By looking at the distribution of propensity scores for
both the treated observations and the control group, we see a good overlap between the
two distributions. This applies to both the histogram and the density plot. We therefore
conclude that the common support condition is satisfied.
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6.5 Propensity score matching differences
By means of the estimated propensity scores, ratings before the financial crisis (control
group) are matched with ratings after and during the financial crisis (treatment group),
using the mentioned matching methods.
The difference we are analyzing is the average treatment effect of the treated (hereby
ATT). ATT is the difference between the outcomes of treated and control observations,
for the observations within the treated group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The ATT
thus focuses directly on the credit ratings after the financial crisis and calculates the gross
effect the crisis had on the ratings. ATT is expressed analytical as:
ATT = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|W = 1] (1)
All four matching methods used in this analysis gave significant ATT 2. However, all
methods except Mahalanobis-metric matching, gave absolute percentage bias over 5%
level. The only matching method that gave satisfactory matching quality was Maha-
lanobis matching within calipers by the propensity score. See appendix C for a summary
of all matching methods and their results.
The resulting ATT for the Mahalanobis-metric matching was approximately 0.75. This
implies that the average numerical rating has increased by 0.75 from the pre-crisis period
to the post-crisis period, after controlling for fluctuations in corporate fundamentals. By
converting the numerical difference using Moody’s Long Term Rating Scale (Table 3) we
see that the rating has gone from an average around Baa1 (8.57 in numeric) to Baa2
(9.32 in numeric). See Figure 6 for a graphical illustration.
7 Cross section analysis
Our analysis is to this point based on an accumulation of observations across countries
and industries. To further explore the data set we want to break down the sample
into several different subsets, so see if there is more and stronger evidence of excessive
downgrading in some parts. We will look closer at investment- and speculative-ratings,
Aaa-rated countries compared to others, differences in industries and also delaying the
post-crisis period by one year to see if this affects the results.
2Significant difference implies a t-stat of more than 1.96 at a 5% significance level
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Figure 6: Estimated treatment effect for long term credit rating
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Investment versus speculative
Since credit ratings are divided into investment- and speculative-rated, it is interesting
to look at differences between these two main groups. By separating the two groups
and perform the same PS-analysis on each group, we find that there is a slightly higher
difference for investment grade than for speculative, as seen in Figure 7.
The difference between the two groups is, however, not large enough to conclude that
investment grade companies were hit harder by a tightening in rating policy, but may
show a tendency. It is also important to note that the number of matched observations
has gone down compared to the analysis for the whole sample, leading to a less robust
result. We also perform out-of sample predictions for 2008-2012 for both investment- and
speculative graded observations based on the three different regression models. When
comparing with the actual ratings we see the same tendency as in the PSM, with a
higher over-estimation frequency within investment-graded observations for all three mod-
els than within speculative-graded. This implies that CRAs actually rated investment-
graded corporates stricter than companies with a speculative grade after the crisis. The
observations are also supported by the mean-comparison tests between predictions and
observations, which shows significant differences ranging from 0.52 to 0.95 within in-
vestment. For speculative, the mean difference is insignificant across all three models.
Compared to the PSM results, the predictions show a somehow stronger result in the
same direction, indicating that investment grade companies were evaluated stricter after
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Figure 7: ATT difference for speculative vs investment graded companies
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Note: Figure 7 shows the ATT difference in ratings between pre crisis period (2004-2007) post crisis
period (2008-2012). The differences is calculated with the listed matching methods in Stata 13. Only
included matching methods with an ATT Difference t-stat within 10% significance level. Data Source:
Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database (accessed 30 March 2014) and Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16
March 2014).
the financial crisis compared to speculative grade companies.
Country domicile
The same analysis can be carried out for companies within Aaa-rated countries compared
to all the other companies. We define Aaa-rated countries as countries that had an Aaa
rating through the whole period of analysis. The selection includes Germany, Finland,
Netherlands, UK, Austria and Luxembourg. If we observe the rating distribution in com-
panies with domicile in PIIGS3 countries versus companies in Aaa countries (Figure 8),
we see a clear tendency of higher share of investment-grade ratings within Aaa Countries.
An important note is that companies within PIIGS countries only constitute 461 obser-
vations. This is too few observations to perform a proper PS-analysis. We have however,
compared the effect on ratings within Aaa-rated countries with all other countries. Even
all other countries except Aaa-rated countries give quite few observations with a total of
967, but enough to give one satisfactory PS-matching model (See figure 9).
From Figure 9 we see that the difference in rating before and after the financial crisis
increase dramatically if we remove companies within Aaa-rated countries. This may
indicate that the credit rating agencies in general have a larger focus on companies within
3PIIGS Countries: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain
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Figure 8: Rating distribution within PIIGS and Aaa rated countries (Only the rating
classes with the largest number of observations is shown)
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Note: Figure 8 provides a graphical illustration of all ratings within PIIGS countries and Aaa countries.
The rating classes Aaa, Aa, Caa, Ca, C is leaved out for illustrational purposes. Data Source: Moody’s
Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
Figure 9: ATT difference for Aaa countries, all countries except Aaa countries and total
sample
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Note: Figure 9 shows the ATT difference in ratings between pre crisis period (2004-2007) post crisis
period (2008-2012). The differences is calculated with the listed matching methods in Stata 13. Only
included matching methods with an ATT Difference t-stat within 10% significance level. Data Source:
Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database (accessed 30 March 2014) and Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16
March 2014).
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less robust countries, and that the threshold for a downgrade in rating is lower within
these countries.
When performing out-of-sample predictions with our three regression models we find the
same tendency. Both OLS-restricted and Panel data FE over-predicts more for observa-
tions within PIIGS countries and all countries except Aaa, than for observations within
Aaa rated countries. More statistically we see a mean difference between predicted- and
observed observations around 0.8 and 1.0 for OLS-restricted and Panel data FE respec-
tively. However, OLS-unrestricted gives very inconsistent answers suggesting a significant
under-prediction of 1.34 within PIIGS countries, measured as difference in means between
predicted and actual observations.
If we focus on the OLS-restricted and Panel data FE we see the same tendency as for
the PSM results; a smaller tightening of credit rating policy after the crisis for companies
within Aaa-rated countries.
However, it is important to acknowledge that both the regression models and the PSM
are based on quite few observations and may not capture all other effects on ratings.
There is always a risk that it may be other effects on the ratings, that has nothing to do
with rating policy, which trigger the result.
Ratings across industries
Another interesting aspect is whether the results vary between different industries. Due to
a small sample of observations within each industry, it is problematic to use propensity
score matching to analyze across industries. The same problem arise when using the
regression models to generate out-of-sample predictions within the different industries.
We have however looked at rating statistics within selected industries, as showed in Table
9.
From the statistics, we see that there are significant differences in both rating variations
across industries, as well as in changes in ratings between the two periods. This implies
that there may be significant differences in rating policy across industries, but it is hard
to detect without further analysis.
Ratings as lagging indicators
One might argue that ratings are functioning as lagging indicators, because they are
reactive by nature. Based on this, it is natural to assume that the effects of the financial
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Table 9: Rating statistics within each industry
Prior to the During/after the
financial crisis financial crisis
(2004-2007) (2008-2012) Difference
Industry # of obs Mean std dev Mean std dev of mean
Total sample 4 270 0.69**
Utility 426 6.39 1.61 7.23 2.03 0.84**
Technology 92 9.24 4.14 11.07 4.42 1.83**
Transportation Services 204 3.82 4.67 6.25 4.76 2.43**
Whlsl dstrbtn 25 14.85 1.91 12.25 1.06 -2.60**
Investment Management 21 1 0 8.88 4.03 7.88**
Constr & Engineering Serv 54 10.14 4.75 13.78 4.04 3.64**
Lodging 20 11.22 1.79 13.73 2.33 2.51*
Gaming 42 13.76 1.78 14.11 2.21 0.74
Consumer Products 449 9.51 3.74 9.12 3.88 -0.39
Forest Products 41 12.73 3.58 11.93 2.08 -0.79
Energy 326 7.93 5.5 8.26 4.56 0.33
Telecommunications 427 10.51 3.85 10.71 3.68 0.21
Pharmaceuticals 88 7.49 5.2 8.04 4 0.55
Leisure & Entertainment 15 9.67 4.13 10.89 4.62 1.22
Packaging 101 14.38 1.63 14.43 2.25 0.05
Defense 47 7.55 3.98 7.44 5.17 -0.11
Aircraft and Aerospace 28 7.67 4.5 7.31 2.18 -0.36
Automotive 234 8.78 3.87 9.46 3.44 0.68
Chemicals 267 10.62 3.89 9.96 3.63 -0.66
Environment 19 11 4.14 8.36 2.8 -2.64
Healthcare 102 8.59 4.57 12 2.63 3.41**
Manufactoring 423 10.4 3.41 10.91 3.44 0.51
Media 278 10.86 3.31 11.35 3.47 0.49
Metals and mining 169 10.77 3.48 10.97 3.7 0.20
Natural Products Processor 54 9.56 2.25 11.89 2.99 2.33**
Retail 187 10.29 3.71 10.9 3.34 0.60
Services 129 10.71 4.32 13.3 2.9 2.59**
Note: Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for company rating within each industry. The difference in means
is analyzed by a two-sided t-test. Symbols * and ** denote significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively.
Data source: Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
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Figure 10: ATT difference for treatment(2009-2012) vs treatment(2008-2012)
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Note: Figure 10 shows the ATT difference in ratings between pre-crisis period and post-crisis period.
The post-crisis period is defined respectively as 2009-2012 (orange) and 2008-2012 (blue) The differences
is calculated with the listed matching methods in Stata 13. Only included matching methods with an
ATT Difference t-stat within 5% significance level. Data Source: Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database
(accessed 30 March 2014) and Moody’s Investor Service (accessed 16 March 2014).
crisis will not affect the ratings before some time. To include such a conception in the
analysis, we redefine the post-crisis period as 2009-2012, in other words, delaying the
effect with one year.
The results from the propensity score matching show a general increase in the differ-
ence before and after the crisis compared to the initial analysis. The results are shown
graphically in Figure 10.
As for the out-of-sample predictions, using the regression models, we find significant
mean-differences between predictions and observations of 0.77, 0.78 and 0.82 for OLS-
unrestricted, OLS-restricted and Panel data FE respectively. These differences are slightly
higher than the differences we found in the initial analysis with time period 2008-2012,
(0.62, 0.70 and 0.83). The out-of-sample predictions thus points in the same direction as
the PSM results.
The results from both PSM and the regression explicitly show that the difference in
ratings is consistently larger when looking at the effect during and after 2009, instead
of 2008. This implies that the CRAs may behave reactive, or at least not proactive.
It additionally supports our previous results that indicate a general tightening of rating
policy.
The differences of means between out-of-sample predictions and observations for all the
analysis in this section are listed in Appendix D.
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8 Discussions and limitations
8.1 Significant variables
The variables found significant in the OLS restricted regression were ROCE using profit/loss
before tax, profit margin, interest cover, solvency ratio asset based and sales. Both inter-
est cover, sales and solvency ratio were also significant in the panel data regression with
fixed effect.
ROCE using profit/loss before tax gives a measure of the return the firm has earned on the
capital employed. Because the ratio includes liabilities in the equation, it is useful when
comparing companies in different industries with varying capital requirement. A high
ROCE indicates that the company is able to generate profits with the capital employed,
thus using their capital efficiently. We should therefore expect a positive correlation
between ROCE and rating, which our results support.
The profit margin is here specified as profit before tax/operating revenue. By using pre-
tax profit, you remove the fact that companies use different tax optimization techniques,
thus also the possibility to manipulate earnings by manipulating the timing and size of
the taxable income. However, profit margin contains financial items such as return from
stock investments, which is unpredictable and has nothing to do with the underlying
operational robustness (Loth, 2014). Both the intuition and our results show a positive
correlation also for this ratio.
Interest cover ratio considers operating profit as a multiple of the firm’s interest expenses.
A high interest cover indicates therefore robustness, thus we should expect a positive cor-
relation with rating. Our findings indicate that interest coverage has great importance
in CRAs’ rating methodology. Koller et al. (2010) underpins this result by finding that a
limited number of credit ratios explained credit ratings fairly well, with interest coverage
as the single most important indicator. The data set they used included all U.S. and
European companies rated by S&P excluding financial institutions. They found that in-
terest coverage explained more than 45 percent of rating differences. They also found that
coverage ratios differed across sectors for a given credit rating. In other words that one
sector could have better credit ratings than others at the same level of interest coverage.
One explanation for this is the earnings volatility. Industries with volatile earnings must
compensate with higher coverage in order to maintain a given rating. Volatile earnings
increase the probability for not fulfilling the company’s interest obligations due to lack
of sufficient cash flow (Koller et al., 2010).
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Solvency ratio is here specified as shareholders’ funds as a percentage of total assets.
Solvency ratios in general measures the company’s ability to meet its long-term obliga-
tions, and give insight in how much shareholders would expect to receive if the company
liquidates. One important aspect with this ratio is that it fails to capture the company’s
ability to fulfill its debt obligations either short or long term. The reason is that market-
to-book ratios can vary significantly across sectors and over time (Koller et al., 2010).
However, solvency is much more relevant in extreme scenarios where the company is un-
der financial distress and creditors want to have a rough measure of available collateral.
Solvency’s relevance in a credit rating process is thus possible to defend.
Sales functions as a proxy of growth, but also reflects company size. Sales as an explaining
factor in credit ratings, can be explained by the fact that larger companies naturally tend
to be more diversified and therefore, all else equal, would tend to have lower business risk
(Amato and Furfine, 2004). Note however that size is not a decision variable because it is
mostly not within the management control. Another important aspect is that it usually
only makes a difference for very large or very small companies.
One variable we expected to be relevant was leverage, in terms of gearing, defined in
Orbis as non-current liabilities plus loans divided by shareholder funds. From general
economic theory, we know that using external debt increases risk of bankruptcy and
induces bankruptcy costs. In addition, high leverage increases the risk of business erosion
and financial distress. Highly leveraged companies faces the risk of missing investment
opportunities or reduce budgets in research in the future, since they need cash in order
to repay debt obligations (Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012). This may lead to missing
investment opportunities and hence opportunities to create more value for the company.
Thus, we should expect a significant negative correlation with corporate ratings. On the
other hand, replacing equity with debt reduces taxable income and thus increases the
value of the firm. External creditors also impose management discipline that prevents
corporate overinvestment (Koller et al., 2010). There exist, in other words, a trade off
which makes leverage not entirely negative. That may be the reason for why we do not
observe gearing as a significant coefficient in the regression models.
None of the macroeconomic variables were shown significant. This is interesting, yet not
too surprising. First, consider this citation from S&P’s Corporate Ratings Criteria:
”The operating environment in the particular country - including, importantly, any
sovereign related stress - can have an overwhelming impact upon company creditwor-
thiness, both direct and indirect. Sovereign credit ratings suggest general risk faced by
local entities, but they may not fully capture risk applicable to the private sector. As a
result, when rating corporate or infrastructure companies or projects, we look beyond the
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sovereign ratings to evaluate the specific economic or country risk that may impact the
entity’s creditworthiness. Such economic or country risk pertains to the impact of gov-
ernment policies upon the obliger’s business and financial environment, and a company’s
ability to insulate itself from these risks.” (Standard & Poor’s, 2008)
Interpreting this would be that macroeconomic factors can explain the credit risk to some
extent, but there are more qualitative measures that cannot easily be quantified.
As our results show, credit rating agencies tend to have largest focus on size and interest
cover out of the quantitative factors when looking at both the regressions and correlation
t-scores. This coincide well with the findings of Pettit et al. (2004) and Koller et al.
(2010), who found that credit ratings are primarily related to size in terms of sales or
market cap, and interest coverage terms.
8.2 Propensity matching results
The ATT from the Mahalanobis-metric matching for the total sample was approximately
0.75. This implies that the CRAs downgraded European corporates more than the wors-
ening in corporate fundamentals would justify. However, the excessive downgrading is
less than one subclass down, from a mean equivalent of Baa1 to Baa2. The results are
hence not very large, and it is problematic to conclude on such a small difference. How-
ever, it may show a tendency toward a stricter rating policy after the financial crisis.
It also points in the same direction as the regressions calculated from pre-crisis period
sample, which in general overestimated the ratings compared to the actual ratings in the
post-crisis period.
One rationale for rating agencies to become excessively conservative after the financial
crisis is their lack of predicting the financial crisis. Much of the criticism after the
financial crisis was in fact that CRAs had issued high ratings on investment products
and corporates which later proved to involve great risk, where perhaps Lehman Brothers
default remains as the most striking example4 . Specially, rating agencies had an incentive
to become more conservative in order to rebuild their own reputation (Ferri et al., 1999).
On the other hand, the reason why we are not observing a larger ATT difference may
be related to credit-cliff dynamic (Manso, 2013). A credit cliff implies that a poorly
performing company will worsen its capital costs substantially by a rating downgrade.
This can put pressure on the company’s liquidity and its business (Gonzales et al., 2004).
4Lehman Brothers’ own debt still had an investment grade rating (A2) when it filed for bankruptcy
protection 15 September 2008 (Krantz, 2013) (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008)
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Because of the major consequences such downgrades may have on businesses, CRAs may
be hesitant to downgrade, at least to a certain extent.
The cross section analysis, with the same matching specification as for the total sample,
showed an ATT difference of 1.36 for all companies that are were not rated Aaa, compared
to a difference of approximately 0.63 for countries within Aaa rated countries. The
reason for this result might be how the financial crisis affected Europe. As opposed to
the financial crisis in USA, the financial crisis in Europe also evolved into a European
sovereign crisis. This may led to a greater focus on company domicile for the CRAs,
especially companies with domicile in less robust economies, thus leading to a lower
threshold to downgrade companies in these economies compared to more robust economies
with Aaa sovereign rating.
8.3 Procyclicality
From our results, with a certain tendency towards excessive downgrade during and after
the financial crisis, we see that rating agencies may behave in a manner that poten-
tially generates procyclical corporate ratings. By procyclical ratings we refer to CRAs’
tendency to excessive downgrade in recession, leading to higher capital cost for the down-
graded companies, thus leading to even poorer results and an intensified recession (same
definition as in introduction).
One can alternatively argue that another aspect of procyclicality is the CRAs overgen-
erous ratings in time leading up to the crisis. Our results show a tightening in rating
standards from 2004-2007 to 2008-2012. We cannot know if the pre-crisis period is repre-
sentative for the ’normal’ rating standard, or if the ratings in this period are generally too
liberal. If the latter is true - that 2004-2007 represents a period of too high credit ratings
according to fundamental values - maybe our results are a mere correction back to a level
before the crisis. However, if the period represents a ’normal’ period, we can argue that
our results show a general tightening of standards that goes beyond the loosening before
the financial crisis.
Ferri et al. (1999) argue that credit ratings are procyclical due to the reputation incentives
faced by CRAs. They further elaborate that CRAs depend on what they refer to as
’reputation capital’ and whether this capital fluctuates procyclically. They then may
have an incentive to set ratings procyclically. We have already mentioned this argument
for excessive downgrading, but a similar reasoning can also be used to explain a less
conservative rating process during an expansionary period. Pursuant to Ferri et al. (1999),
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the CRAs’ reputation capital is likely to be high during an expansionary period, thus
leading to less focus on building reputation and hence a less strict rating process.
The cross section analysis shows signs of rating acting as a lagging indicator, meaning
that the downgrades do not happen in the initial stage of the crisis. With respect to
procyclicality this may argue against procyclicality due to the fact that lagging indicators
will not be an accelerating factor, but rather behave in a reactive manner. El-Shagi
(2010) supports this to some extent, although looking at sovereign ratings, stating that
downgrading of sovereign ratings do not lead to an acceleration of the crisis, due to
the lagging behavior. However, a procyclical behavior can also be defined as an effect
that makes the crisis deeper and longer than initially expected, in this case the feedback
effect from downgrades. Both Ga¨rtner et al. (2011) and Manso (2013) mention such a
feedback effect, stating that downgrades might actually trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy,
making them part of a procyclical economy. Pursuant to Manso, small shocks to corporate
fundamentals due to the financial crisis, may lead to multi-notch downgrades, making the
business environment for the corporates even harder, leading to an additional reduction
in business activity.
For the first time in recent history comprehensive regulations have been added on the
CRAs’ methods in Europe. They are to have more openness and transparency in their
process to ensure more accurate ratings. Utzig (2010) argues that these regulations
probably will help with the corporate governance of the CRAs. However, he addresses
that the regulations lack the power to improve the competition to the oligopolistic market
of CRAs and that they are not made more liable for their ratings. More relevant for this
study is the immediate effects of the regulations, and whether they contributed to tighten
the standards. Our results show stricter standards after the crisis, and one might look
at this as a one-time drastic remedy to correct the levels of ratings, and hereby use these
new harsher standards. In this way, the change we observe might not be explained by
procyclical anatomy of credit ratings, but rather by a single event of tougher standards
due to regulations.
8.4 Limitations
As seen from the cross section analysis, there are significant differences between industries.
Optimally we should have included an industry-variable in our PSM in order to capture
other industry characteristics, such as business cycle, competition, number of competitors
etc. These are characteristics not reflected in the company’s financial ratios. However,
many of such characteristics are of more qualitative nature, thus much more difficult to
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quantify in a model.
Since we are doing PSM on firm characteristics, the same limitation applies to macro-
indicators. The lack of macro-indicators in the PSM implies that we are not picking up
changes in macro variables.
Another risk is the possibility of not matching on the most important variables, meaning
that there could exist other and more relevant variables we that we could have used in
the PSM replacing the other variables used.
Our study is based on financials that are considered quantitative variables. We acknowl-
edged that our analysis lacked qualitative variables early in the research. Even though the
CRAs themselves state that they use qualitative measures on a widely bases, this would
be hard to implement in our models. However, some of our results highlight the problem
of missing qualitative variables and we must therefore urge this limitation once again.
The regression models have low to moderate explanatory power, suggesting quantitative
variables do not explain the whole assessment of a credit rating.
We also need to express once more that all financial institutions such as banks and
insurance companies are not included in our analysis. This is due to their complex capital
structure and new regulations that are exclusively for this industry. We do therefore have
no knowledge of what the effects would be if we implemented these companies into our
models.
Ratings are not perfect, but constitute the best tool we have for quantification of risk. The
alternative to traditional rating is to let market prices quantify the risk for us. Moody’s
have developed ’Market Implied Ratings’ (MIR) based on prices from the CDS5 , bond
and equity markets (Moody’s Analytics, 2010). By using MIR, you achieve ratings more
in line with the market and its free flow of information and transparency. However, such
ratings are also much more volatile and are not equally foresighted as traditional ratings.
We do not want to go deeper into this field, but rather acknowledge that there exist
alternatives to additional ratings with their pros and cons, constituting an interesting
subject for further research.
9 Conclusion
This study addresses the influence of financial crisis on corporate credit ratings, inves-
tigating European corporate credit ratings in two different periods: before the financial
5Credit Default Swap
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crisis (2004-2007) and after/during the financial crisis (2008-2012). The main focus is to
analyze whether there has been a general tightening in rating practice during and after
the financial crisis.
By using regressions, we find that rating agencies seem to focus on variables within
profitability, efficiency, operational, structure and size in line with their own stated rating
methodology. However, when looking at the regression coefficients and the statistical
correlation we find that the CRAs tend to have largest focus on size and interest coverage
out of the quantitative factors.
Next, using a two-sample t-test to test the difference of mean for all ratios, ascertain
a general decrease in ratios after 2008, thus indicating that the ratings are expected to
have declined somewhat even with unchanged rating policies. The predicted ratings for
the period 2008-2012, using the estimated regressions based on 2004-2007, tend to be
generally higher than the actual ratings in all three regression-models used. Based on the
quantitative models alone we can say that companies need better financials, all others
alike, to receive the same rating after the crisis compared to before. This result of over
predictions is a small indication that the CRAs actually rated corporates stricter after
the crisis.
The findings from the propensity score matching points in the same direction. By looking
at the ATT difference between the two periods, we find a general downgrading of approx-
imately 0.75, where a value of 1 equals one sub-rank rating, adjusted for the effects from
corporate fundamental variables. Although the difference is not large, it indicates that
the CRAs actually may have a tendency of lowering their ratings after the financial crisis.
When comparing the ATT difference between speculative- and investment rated corpo-
rates we cannot find any clear difference. The regression models show a weak tendency
towards higher differences within investment, but not enough to conclude. There is how-
ever, a tendency of a smaller ATT difference for corporates within Aaa-rated countries
compared to corporates with domicile in the other countries. The results from the other
cross-section analysis are also too vague to draw any strong conclusions, but they give
indications that could be an interesting approach for future research. We see considerable
differences in rating fluctuations when comparing industries. Also, we find some evidence
saying credit ratings are lagging indicators, as the ATT difference grows as we set our
post-crisis period to a later point in time. This is also supported by the regression models.
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Appendices
A Ratios used in the data set
Ratios Definition
Profitability / Capital efficiency
ROE using P/L before tax (%) (Profit before tax / Shareholders funds)*100
ROCE using P/L before tax (%) (Profit before tax + Interest paid) / (Shareholders funds + Non current 
liabilities)*100
ROA using P/L before tax (%) (Profit before tax / Total assets)*100
ROE using Net income (%) (Net income / Shareholder funds)*100
ROCE using Net income (%) (Net income + Interest paid) / (Shareholder funds + Non current 
liabilities)*100
ROA using Net income (Net income / Total Assets)*100
Profit Margin (%) (Profit before tax / Operating revenue)*100
Gross margin (%) (Gross profit / Operating revenue)*100
EBITDA margin (%) (EBITDA / Operating revenue)*100
EBIT margin (%) (EBIT / Operating revenue)*100
Cash flow / Operating revenue (%) (Cash flow / Operating revenue)*100
Enterprise value / EBITDA (x) Enterprise value / (Operating profit (loss) + Depreciation)
Market Cap / Cash flow from operations (x) Annual Market Cap / 315514 (non-US comps) or OTLO (US comps)
Operational Ratios
Net asset turnover (x) Operating revenue / (Shareholders funds + Non current liabilities)
Interest cover (x) Operating profit / Interest paid
Stock turnover (x) Operating revenue / Stocks
Collection period (days) (Debtors / Operating revenue)*360
Credit period (days) (Creditors / Operating revenue)*360
Export revenue / Operating revenue (%) (Exports / Operating revenue)*100
R&D expenses / Operating revenue (%) (Research  & development / Operating revenue)*100
Structural ratios
Current ratio (x) Current assets / Current liabilities
Liquidity ratio (x) (Current assets – Stocks) / Current liabilities
Shareholders liquidity ratio (x) Shareholders funds / Non current liabilities
Solvency ratio (Asset based) (%) (Shareholders funds / Total assets)*100
Solvency ratio (Liability based) (%) (Shareholders funds / (Non current liabilities + Current liabilities))*100
Gearing (%) ((Non current liabilities + Loans) / Shareholders funds)*100
Size
Sales Mil EUR
Total assets Mil EUR
Macroeconomic
Unemployment The share of the labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment. (% of total labor force)
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index (annual %)
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency
Current Balance The sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, and 
net secondary income. (%of GDP)
Note: Table provides definitions of all financial ratios exported from Orbis and World Bank. Source:
Orbis User guide Definitions and World Bank - World Development Indicators.
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Note: Table shows pairwise correlations for all variables. Data Source: Bureau Van Dijk - Orbis Database.
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C Propensity score matching
ATT Difference t-stat
N
ea
re
st
N
ei
gh
b
or no replacement, no caliper 0.656 2.8
no replacement, caliper=0.01 0.738 3.12
With replacement, no caliper 0.638** 2.22
With replacement, caliper=0.01 0.601 2.1
1-
to
-1
m
at
ch
in
g 10 neighbor, no caliper 0.531** 2.2
20 neighbor, no caliper 0.594** 2.52
10 neighbor, caliper=0.01 0.512** 2.15
20 neighbor, caliper=0.01 0.541** 2.32
K
er
n
el
Epanechnikov Kernel, bandwidth=0.06 (default) 0.498 2.28
Gaussian Kernel, bandwidth=0.06 (default) 0.407 1.88
Epanechnikov Kernel, bandwidth=0.01 0.529** 2.27
Gaussian Kernel, bandwidth=0.01 0.585** 2.54
M
ah
al
an
ob
is
-m
et
ri
c
m
at
ch
in
g Matching on varlist 0.642** 2.17
Matching on pscore and varlist 0.758** 2.59
Matching on pscore and varlist, caliper=0.1 0.456* 0.85
Matching on pscore and varlist, caliper=0.8 0.746* 2.52
R
ad
iu
s
m
at
ch
in
g
no caliper 0.421 3.46
caliper=0.01 0.514 2.23
Note: Table shows the ATT difference in ratings between pre crisis period (2004-2007) post crisis
period (2008-2012) for all corporates. Symbols * and ** denote absolute bias levels between treated
and control group within each financial ratio of 5% and 10%, respectively. Data Source: Bureau Van
Dijk Orbis Database and Moody’s Investor Service.
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D Mean comparisons, out-of-sample predictions
OLS unrestricted OLS restricted Panel data FE
Total sample 0.62** 0.70** 0.83**
Lagged (2009-2012) 0.77** 0.78** 0.82**
Investment 0.95** 0.52** 0.56**
Speculative -0.01 0.13 0.22*
Aaa countries 0.68** 0.67** 0.66**
All other countries 0.02 0.81** 1.12**
PIIGS countries -1.34** 0.83** 1.04**
Note: Table shows the pairwise comparisons of means between predictions and ob-
servations in the post crisis period (2008-2012). The listed differences are defined
as: Observation - Prediction. Symbols * and ** denote significance levels of 5% and
1%, respectively. Data Source: Bureau Van Dijk Orbis Database and Moody’s In-
vestor Service.
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